New Opposition trends & the social democratic vision

"Politics, like life, is a matter of choices. Choices can only be made among alternatives, existing or new. Of the alternatives available, the country is safest under Mahinda Rajapakse’s leadership, who is in any case, the popularly elected (and popular) president."

by Dayan Jayathilleka

“Sins against hope are the only ones that attain neither forgiveness nor redemption. - Eduardo Galeano, ‘Aguas de Octubre’, La Jornada, Nov 1, 2004


“I believe that the theory of civil society is completely mistaken. At any rate I should say that in the break-up of Yugoslavia just as in most other conflicts between the state and civil society, I was regularly on the side of the state.” - Slavoj Zizek, ‘Philosophy is not a Dialogue’, in Badiou & Zizek, 2009, ‘Philosophy in the Present’, p 65.

(September 26, Singapore City, Sri Lanka Guardian) There were three new developments of varying importance within the oppositional space. (a) The friction between the JVP and the UNP (b) the inner-party dynamics within the UNP and the emergence of ‘green shoots’- a rare instance of grassroots civil society political initiative in the resolutions by several UNP PC and PS formations, and (c) the TNA’s rejection of the UNP leader’s gratuitous unilateral nomination of one of its members to the parliamentary council. These developments reveal not only the inevitable unevenness and segmentation of the oppositional space, but that there are competing interests and political projects within it.

The friction between the JVP and UNP reflects a deeper issue. On the one hand, the JVP does not wish to associate itself with a UNP under its present leadership because that would make it vulnerable to criticism by the NFF and JHU, with which it shares the ultranationalist Sinhala youth vote. On the other hand, the JVP does not wish to support or encourage the UNP reformists because such a new, youthful leader and deputy (Sajith-Dayasiri) could revive the UNP to the point that it completes the process that Mahinda Rajapakse started, i.e. the constriction of the political space occupied by the JVP, and its consequent ideological and socio-political marginalisation.

The JVP wishes that the UNP’s crisis would go on and that generational transition would be slow, so that it can project Sarath Fonseka and itself as the ‘real Opposition’ and cut into the UNP’s social base.

This is not a desirable scenario, because the JVP always has a dualistic character. If one wishes to understand the JVP and predict its behaviour one has to read its discourse within its own milieu (in Sinhala) and watch its conduct in its bases. The reportage on the website Groundviews by a campus student, of the Taliban type behaviour of the authorities and the JVP in its oldest red base, the Jayawardenepura University - from where many of its cadre, including central committee members tend to come-is indicative of the collective mentality within the JVP. A potential social democratic party or new Latin American left equivalent these guys ain’t.

If the JVP/DNA becomes the main focus of opposition sentiment and the main driver of opposition politics, one needs to worry as to the shape and character of the endgame. Sri Lankan society and people do not need renewed confrontation, conflict instability and unrest. That will not merely destabilise the economy but place a strain on the security forces, and provide temptation for the imposition of ‘exceptional measures’. If however, the UNP is the main opposition, there will be a system-wide safety net and soft landing. The bind is that this is unsustainable and even impossible so long as the UNP is, and is led, the way it is.

The post 18th amendment, which has merits but also some serious flaws in the argument. Those who propose it do not examine whether that is, in and of itself, the programmatic need of the day. They also wrongly identify the likely and desirable vehicles for this project and fail to identify the only forces capable of such an act of agency.

My perspective and model is of a progressive, pluralist-democratic Asian Modernity. This will be both pre-requisite and resultant of catch-up with the unfolding Asian economic miracle. Sri Lanka needs greater modernisation, openness and multiethnic national integration/nation building. The country remains, in essence, a representative multiparty democracy in an uneven and still open-ended convalescent transition. Some say Sri Lanka requires regime change, others say stability and continuity. The ‘regime change’ school regard the slogan of stability and continuity as code for totalitarianism and/or dictatorship. I argue that ‘regime change’ is neither feasible nor in the national interest. What is rational and realistic is engendering change in regime behaviour and generating ‘molecular’ regime evolution through (a) a benign, positive shift in the local ‘settings’ and conditions, and (b) constructive external engagement

Those who reject out of hand the call for stability and continuity err and exaggerate in seeing the main danger as that of (dynastic) dictatorship. The real danger in an unqualified slogan of stability (‘stability above all’, ‘stability at any cost’) is that of stagnation. Stagnation comes from the shift from a two party system to a one -party dominant system through the failure of a competitive second party to emerge, evolve or sustain itself. ‘One- party dominant’ systems are not one party or one person dictatorships. Post-war Italy and post-war Japan under the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats respectively are classic examples, as was India until 1977 and Mexico under the PRI. If Sri Lanka has shifted or is shifting to a one party dominant system or is in danger of doing so, it is the result of the Opposition’s obsolescence and ossification— as Fidel declared about the collapse of Soviet socialism, “not homicide, but suicide”. The counter to stagnation is not frontal assault; a political charge of the Light Brigade. Both instability and stagnation can be avoided and a process of modernising reforms triggered by political competition, creative initiatives, new combinations and openings, which impact on the balance of social and ideological forces.

There are only two viable vehicles for social democracy in Sri Lanka, and these are the main democratic formations, the SLFP (or SLFP-led UPFA) and the UNP. Either, both or any combination of components from these parties, should be the prospective targets for efforts at social democratisation. It is obvious though, that a leader who broke with tradition and affiliated his Party with the International Democratic Union (IDU) led by the western world’s Right, cannot be the candidate for this conversion. Today, President Rajapakse is the best representative of National Democracy and the UNP reformists identified with young Premadasa, the best bet for (pluralist) Social Democracy. While the best case scenario would be a broad ideological and value consensus, with both SLFP and UNP becoming ‘modernising national and social democratic’ formations, Sri Lanka could be almost as well served by two other scenarios: (i) one of the two major parties ‘upholding the twin banners’ of national and social democracy or (ii) one of them being the party of ‘national democracy’ while the other becomes the party of ‘social democracy’. They must compete or collude to occupy neither Right nor Left but precisely a modern, moderate, progressive centre.

Politics, like life, is a matter of choices. Choices can only be made among alternatives, existing or new. Of the alternatives available, the country is safest under Mahinda Rajapakse’s leadership, who is in any case, the popularly elected (and popular) president.

Permit me a brief detour: Serbia watered down its own draft resolution to the UNGA and agreed to one which sealed the acceptance of the secession of Kosovo. Southern Sudan votes in a referendum on independence this month, under a peace agreement signed five years back. The UN Secretary -General is being lobbied that he should play a role in managing the transition from the morning after, and helping ensure that Sudan accepts a widely expected verdict of secession. Had the Ranil Wickremesinghe-Chandrika condominium of ‘05 managed to prevail over the Mahinda Rajapakse challenge, this would have been Sri Lanka’s fate, via the CFA-PTOMS. Not only did Mahinda defeat the Tigers, he didn’t blink in the face of foreign pressure and external efforts to extricate them. He also managed relations with India in such a manner as to avoid another ‘87.

Does my perspective evade or justify the phenomenon of tendencies towards the abuse or monopolisation of political power? When a trend towards monopoly is observed or feared in any sector of the economy/the market, some may protest and denounce, others boycott, still others may de-link from the market and opt for communal forms of small scale production. Then there are those like myself who understand that the only real or the most effective counter to monopoly is competition, and the input most worth making is to suggest measures that make existing or potential competitors more competitive. This win-win option corrects market distortions, improves the performance and product of erstwhile monopolies which could sit on their laurels, lowers commodity prices and guarantees ensures consumer sovereignty.

As in economics, so also in politics, and my transparent, constructive intellectual and ideological intervention can appear as a recommendation of passivity or a tacit defence of ‘totalitarianism’, only to the ill-informed or the irresponsible. I just want folks to take a global view; think things through.